A Citizen-Candidate Model of Tax Competition with Interdependent Preferences

被引：0

作者：

Kasamatsu, Satoshi ^{[1
]}

Masuda, Taku ^{[2
]}

Ogawa, Hikaru ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Tokyo, 7 Chome 3-1 Hongo, Tokyo, Japan

[2] Deloitte Tohmatsu Financial Advisory LLC, Chiyoda Ku, 3-2-3 Marunouchi, Tokyo, Japan

来源：

FINANZARCHIV | 2020年 / 76卷 / 04期

关键词：

tax competition; citizen-candidate model; altruism; malice; ALTRUISM; PROVISION; CONTESTS; POLICY; ENVY;

D O I：

10.1628/fa-2020-0011

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

In a citizen-candidate model of tax competition, this study describes the emergence of a policymaker (political leader) that has a hostile or altruistic stance toward neighboring countries. The results show that (i) when countries competing for mobile capital have similar positions on the import/export of capital, an altruistic citizen will be elected as the political leader, and (ii) when their capital positions differ, a citizen that has malicious preferences can become the representative of the country.

引用

页码：313 / 328

页数：16

共 32 条

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