Contract Extensions: The Case of Major League Baseball

被引:10
作者
Krautmann, Anthony C. [1 ]
机构
[1] Depaul Univ, Dept Econ, 1 E Jackson, Chicago, IL 60604 USA
关键词
contract extensions; MARGINAL REVENUE; PERFORMANCE; PAY;
D O I
10.1177/1527002516656727
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article is concerned with how contract extensions create incentives that affect the characteristics of compensation of Major League Baseball players. We begin with a description of a number of attributes of the negotiation process. Using a sample of contract extensions, we summarize a number of characteristics of this phenomenon. For example, we show how both sides are made better off as a result of these negotiations and that most extensions take place during the last year of the existing contract. Furthermore, for those players with less than 6 years of service, the new contract typically extends beyond the player's arbitration-eligible years.
引用
收藏
页码:299 / 314
页数:16
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