Profit sharing, risk sharing, and firm size: Implications of efficiency wages

被引:2
作者
Chang, Juin-Jen [1 ]
机构
[1] Fu Jen Catholic Univ, Inst Econ Acad Sinica, Taipei 115, Taiwan
关键词
profit sharing; risk sharing; efficiency wages; firm size;
D O I
10.1007/s11187-006-0022-y
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
By taking account of output fluctuations, this paper constructs a synthesis of profit-sharing and efficiency-wage models to highlight the role of the risk attitudes of the firm and its employees. We show, contrary to the traditional efficiency wage theory, that in a profit-sharing economy unemployment is no longer a necessary device to induce work effort and, consequently, the labor market equilibrium may be characterized by full employment. Such a result is more likely to be true when the economy is characterized by small-sized firms. In addition, we also provide a preliminary sketch of the situations in which the firm chooses a profit-sharing program or a fixed-wage one, and discuss how a firm determines its pay parameters and employment in response to output fluctuations.
引用
收藏
页码:261 / 273
页数:13
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