Explaining Germany's Position on European Banking Union

被引：3
作者：
Cassell, Mark K. [1 ]
Hutcheson, Anna [2 ]
机构：
[1] Kent State Univ, Polit Sci, Kent, OH 44240 USA
[2] Kent State Univ, Kent, OH 44242 USA
来源：
GERMAN POLITICS | 2019年 / 28卷 / 04期
关键词：
PROSPECT-THEORY; DECISION;
D O I：
10.1080/09644008.2019.1621296
中图分类号：
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号：
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要：
Much has been written about European banking union and Germany's role in shaping it. Missing, however, is a comprehensive explanation for Germany's contradictory positions on banking union: German policymakers gambled on a single supervisory mechanism, and a single resolution mechanism yet drew the line on European-wide deposit insurance. We explain Germany's mixed positions on banking union by drawing on prospect theory and theories of policy salience.
引用
收藏
页码：562 / 582
页数：21
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