Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

被引：9
作者：
Echenique, Federico [1 ]
Galichon, Alfred [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Mail Code 228-77, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
[2] NYU, Dept Econ, 19 W 4th St, New York, NY 10012 USA
[3] NYU, Courant Inst, New York, NY 10012 USA
[4] Sci Po, Dept Econ, F-75007 Paris, France
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2017年 / 101卷
基金：
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词：
Market design; Matching theory; National resident matching program; GAME-THEORY; CONTRACTS; STABILITY; SUBSTITUTES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：63 / 77
页数：15
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