The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

被引:183
作者
Pinkerton, Evelyn [1 ]
Edwards, Danielle N. [2 ]
机构
[1] Simon Fraser Univ, Sch Resource & Environm Management, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada
[2] Ecotrust Canada, Vancouver, BC V6B 2Y5, Canada
关键词
Individual transferable quotas; Fisheries management; Fisheries policy; ITQ-MANAGEMENT; FISHERIES; SYSTEM;
D O I
10.1016/j.marpol.2009.02.004
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Despite the increasingly positive reviews of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), few Studies have considered how quota leasing activities can reduce the economic benefits to society and to fishermen operating under the ITQ fisheries system. This analysis reveals negative economic impacts of ITQs previously overlooked by examining the extent of quota leasing and the relationship between the catch value, the cost of fishing, and the quota lease price in the BC halibut fishery, long considered a poster child for ITQs. Findings challenge assumptions of economic theory used to promote the benefits of ITQs. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:707 / 713
页数:7
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