Substantial Physician Turnover And Beneficiary 'Churn' In A Large Medicare Pioneer ACO

被引:18
作者
Hsu, John [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Vogeli, Christine [4 ]
Price, Mary [5 ]
Brand, Richard [6 ]
Chernew, Michael E. [7 ]
Mohta, Namita [8 ,9 ]
Chaguturu, Sreekanth K. [10 ,11 ,12 ]
Weil, Eric [10 ,13 ,14 ]
Ferris, Timothy G. [4 ,10 ,11 ,12 ]
机构
[1] Massachusetts Gen Hosp, Clin Econ & Policy Anal Program, Mongan Inst, Boston, MA 02114 USA
[2] Harvard Med Sch, Dept Med, Boston, MA 02115 USA
[3] Harvard Med Sch, Dept Hlth Care Policy, Boston, MA 02115 USA
[4] Massachusetts Gen Hosp, Med, Boston, MA 02114 USA
[5] Massachusetts Gen Hosp, Mongan Inst, Boston, MA 02114 USA
[6] Univ Calif San Francisco, Dept Epidemiol & Biostat, San Francisco, CA 94143 USA
[7] Harvard Med Sch, Dept Hlth Care Policy, Boston, MA USA
[8] Ctr Healthcare Delivery Sci, Boston, MA USA
[9] Brigham & Womens Hosp, 75 Francis St, Boston, MA 02115 USA
[10] Partners HealthCare, Populat Hlth, Boston, MA USA
[11] Massachusetts Gen Hosp, Boston, MA 02114 USA
[12] Harvard Med Sch, Med, Boston, MA USA
[13] Massachusetts Gen Phys Org, Boston, MA USA
[14] Massachusetts Gen Hosp, Div Gen Internal Med, Boston, MA 02114 USA
基金
美国国家卫生研究院;
关键词
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS; HEALTH-CARE; PAYMENT; POPULATION; SERVICE; SYSTEM; REFORM;
D O I
10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1107
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
Alternative payment models, such as accountable care organizations (ACOs), attempt to stimulate improvements in care delivery by better alignment of payer and provider incentives. However, limited attention has been paid to the physicians who actually deliver the care. In a large Medicare Pioneer ACO, we found that the number of beneficiaries per physician was low (median of seventy beneficiaries per physician, or less than 5 percent of a typical panel). We also found substantial physician turnover: More than half of physicians either joined (41 percent) or left (18 percent) the ACO during the 2012-14 contract period studied. When physicians left the ACO, most of their attributed beneficiaries also left the ACO. Conversely, about half of the growth in the beneficiary population was because of new physicians affiliating with the ACO; the remainder joined after switching physicians. These findings may help explain the muted financial impact ACOs have had overall, and they raise the possibility of future gaming on the part of ACOs to artificially control spending. Policy refinements include coordinated and standardized risk-sharing parameters across payers to prevent any dilution of the payment incentives or confusion from a cacophony of incentives across payers.
引用
收藏
页码:640 / 648
页数:9
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