Weighted weak semivalues

被引：26

作者：

Calvo, E

Santos, JC

机构：

[1] Univ Valencia, Dept Anal Econ, Valencia, Spain

[2] Univ Basque Country, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Dept Econ Aplicada 1, Bilbao 48015, Spain

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2000年 / 29卷 / 01期

关键词：

probabilistic values; semivalues; weighted Shapley values;

D O I：

10.1007/s001820050001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We introduce two new value solutions: weak semivalues and weighted weak semivalues. They are subfamilies of probabilistic values, and they appear by adding the axioms of balanced contributions and weighted balanced contributions respectively. We show that the effect of the introduction of these axioms is the appearance of consistency in the beliefs of players about the game.

引用

页码：1 / 9

页数：9

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