Characteristics of a firm's information environment and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders

被引:399
作者
Frankel, R [1 ]
Li, X [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
关键词
capital markets; information asymmetry; analysts; insider trading;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.09.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine how financial statement informativeness, analyst following, and news relate to the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Corporations' timely disclosures of value relevant information and information collection by outsiders reduce information asymmetry, limiting insiders' ability to trade profitably on private information. We use the profitability and intensity of insider trades to proxy for information asymmetry. We find that increased analyst following is associated with reduced profitability of insider trades and reduced insider purchases. Financial statement informativeness is negatively associated with the frequency of insider purchases. However, company news, good or bad, is positively associated with insider purchase frequency. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:229 / 259
页数:31
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