GTES: An Optimized Game-Theoretic Demand-Side Management Scheme for Smart Grid

被引:127
|
作者
Fadlullah, Zubair Md. [1 ]
Duong Minh Quan [1 ]
Kato, Nei [1 ]
Stojmenovic, Ivan [2 ]
机构
[1] Tohoku Univ, Grad Sch Informat Sci, Sendai, Miyagi 9808579, Japan
[2] Univ Ottawa, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada
来源
IEEE SYSTEMS JOURNAL | 2014年 / 8卷 / 02期
基金
日本学术振兴会; 加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
Energy optimization; game theory; real-time pricing; smart grid;
D O I
10.1109/JSYST.2013.2260934
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Demand-side management in smart grids has emerged as a hot topic for optimizing energy consumption. In conventional research works, energy consumption is optimized from the perspective of either the users or the power company. In this paper, we investigate how energy consumption may be optimized by taking into consideration the interaction between both parties. We propose a new energy price model as a function of total energy consumption. Also, we propose a new objective function, which optimizes the difference between the value and cost of energy. The power supplier pulls consumers in a round-robin fashion and provides them with energy price parameter and current consumption summary vector. Each user then optimizes his own schedule and reports it to the supplier, which, in turn, updates its energy price parameter before pulling the next consumers. This interaction between the power company and its consumers is modeled through a two-step centralized game, based on which we propose our game-theoretic energy schedule (GTES) method. The objective of our GTES method is to reduce the peak-to-average power ratio by optimizing the users' energy schedules. The performance of the GTES approach is evaluated through computer-based simulations.
引用
收藏
页码:588 / 597
页数:10
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