Fast charging stations: Simulating entry and location in a game of strategic interaction

被引：15

作者：

Bernardo, Valeria ^{[1
]}

Borrell, Joan-Ramon ^{[2
,3
,4
]}

Perdiguero, Jordi ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Barcelona, Grp Governs & Mercats GiM, Inst Econ Aplicada IREA, Diagonal Ave 690 Tower 6 Off 6334, Barcelona 08034, Spain

[2] Univ Barcelona, Grp Governs & Mercats GiM, Inst Econ Aplicada IREA, Dept Econometria Estadist & Econ Aplicada, Diagonal Ave 690 Tower 6 Off 6318, Barcelona 08034, Spain

[3] Univ Navarra, IESE Business Sch, Publ Private Sect Res Ctr, Pamplona, Spain

[4] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Ctr Econ Salud CRES, Barcelona, Spain

[5] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, Dept Econ Aplicada, Edifici B Campus UAB, Bellaterra 08193, Spain

来源：

ENERGY ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 60卷

关键词：

Electric vehicle; Fast charging; Games of strategic interaction; Entry models; Regional planning; GASOLINE DEMAND; DIFFERENTIATION; METAANALYSIS; COMPETITION; STABILITY; MARKET; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.eneco.2016.09.026

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper uses a game of strategic interaction to simulate entry and location of fast charging stations for electric vehicles. It evaluates the equilibria obtained in terms of social welfare and firm spatial differentiation. Using Barcelona mobility survey, demographic data and the street graph we find that only at an electric vehicle penetration rate above 3% does a dense network of stations appear as the equilibrium outcome of a market with no fiscal transfers. We also find that price competition drives location differentiation measured not only in Euclidean distances but also in consumer travel distances. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：293 / 305

页数：13

共 30 条

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