Founder's political connections, second generation involvement, and family firm performance: Evidence from China

被引:156
作者
Xu, Nianhang [1 ]
Yuan, Qingbo [2 ]
Jiang, Xuanyu [3 ]
Chan, Kam C. [4 ]
机构
[1] Renmin Univ China, Sch Business, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Melbourne, Dept Accounting, Melbourne, Vic 3010, Australia
[3] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Accountancy, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[4] Western Kentucky Univ, Gordon Ford Coll Business, Dept Finance, Bowling Green, KY 42101 USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Family succession; Founder; Second generation involvement; Political connections; Tunneling; OWNERSHIP; GOVERNANCE; BUSINESS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.01.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine whether a specialized asset of family firms, founders' political connections, influences the second generation involvement in family firms in China. We further investigate the impact of such second generation involvement on firm performance. The findings suggest that founders' political connections are a critical factor in the decision of second generation involvement, with politically connected founders more likely to appoint a second generation as a family firm chairman, CEO, or director. The results are consistent with the transfer cost hypothesis of Bennedsen etal. (2015). Moreover, we document that second generation involvement enhances firm performance, with the curtailment of tunneling as an important channel of performance improvement. Our results are robust to different empirical models and controlling for possible endogeneity issues. In addition, second-generation effects are more pronounced in firms with less outside monitoring. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:243 / 259
页数:17
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