Opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting: Nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity: Comment

被引:18
作者
Marx, LM [1 ]
Shaffer, G
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[2] Univ Rochester, Simon Sch Business, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/0002828041464588
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:796 / 801
页数:6
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