Noughty bits: the subatomic scope of negation

Since Fodor 1970, negation has worn a Homogeneity Condition to the effect that homogeneous predicates (e. g., (1), (2)) denote homogeneously-all (1) or nothing (2)-to characterize the meaning of (1)-(2) when uttered out-of-the blue, in contrast to (3)-(4): (1) The mirrors are smooth. (2) The mirrors are not smooth. (3) The mirrors circle the telescope's reflector. (4) The mirrors do not circle the telescope's reflector. It has been a problem for philosophical logic and for the semantics of natural language that (5)-(6) appear to defy the Principle of Excluded Middle while (7)-(8) do not- 5) Smooth(m) (6) (sic)Smooth(m) (7) Circle(m) (8) (sic)Smooth(m). An impoverished logical form (5)-(8) has been the occasion to embellish all else-Boolean algebra, lexical presuppositions, Strongest Meaning Hypothesis, trivalence, supervaluation, double strengthening, etc., enriching the semantics and pragmatics with what remains a special theory of negation, which may be dismissed when the logical syntax and semantics of negation reflects that negated sentences are also tensed sentences.