Knowledge and networks: An experimental test of how network knowledge affects coordination

被引:25
作者
Enemark, Daniel [1 ]
McCubbins, Mathew D. [2 ]
Weller, Nicholas [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ So Calif, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
[2] Univ So Calif, Gould Sch Law, Marshall Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
[3] Univ So Calif, Sch Int Relat, Dept Polit Sci, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
关键词
Information; Experimental methods; Coordination; Communication/information networks; INTERNATIONAL-COOPERATION; COLLECTIVE ACTION; SOCIAL NETWORKS; CREDIBILITY; LEADERSHIP; PARADOX;
D O I
10.1016/j.socnet.2012.10.001
中图分类号
Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
030303 ;
摘要
Scholars in the social sciences use network theory to study a range of collective action problems. Often the goal is to identify how the structure of the network affects efforts to coordinate or cooperate, and research suggests that adding connections to a network can improve the performance of groups faced with such tasks. On the other hand, theory and empirics also suggest that additional connections can degrade the performance of a network. If connections can have negative effects then it is important to consider if there are alternatives to adding connections to a network that can also improve network performance. Because a primary function of connections in a network is to disseminate information, providing individuals with more information about the network may act as a substitute for adding connections to a network. We test experimentally whether providing subjects with more information about the structure of networks can improve coordination. We find that a more complete view of the network leads to faster coordination, but the magnitude of this effect depends on network structure. These results suggest that changing what actors know about a network can improve outcomes without having to add connections that may impede overall performance. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:122 / 133
页数:12
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