Shirking on the court: Testing for the incentive effects of guaranteed pay

被引：57
作者：
Berri, David J.
Krautmann, Anthony C.
机构：
[1] Calif State Coll Bakersfield, Dept Econ, Bakersfield, CA 93311 USA
[2] Depaul Univ, Dept Econ, Chicago, IL 60604 USA
来源：
ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 2006年 / 44卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1093/ei/cbj033
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Prior work on long-term contracts and the incentive to shirk has focused almost exclusively on Major League Baseball. The current inquiry is the first to examine shirking in the National Basketball Association. We employed two different measures of player productivity. When the NBA's measure is used, we find evidence consistent with allegations of shirking behavior. But when productivity is measured in a fashion more consistent with economists' definition of marginal product, the evidence of shirking evaporates.
引用
收藏
页码：536 / 546
页数：11
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