Completely stealthy attacks on cyber-physical system with parity space based monitoring

被引:6
作者
Martynova, Dina [1 ]
Zhang, Ping [1 ]
机构
[1] Tech Univ Kaiserslautern TUK, Inst Automat Control, D-67663 Kaiserslautern, Germany
来源
2019 AMERICAN CONTROL CONFERENCE (ACC) | 2019年
关键词
FAULT-DETECTION; OPTIMIZATION;
D O I
10.23919/acc.2019.8814300
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The parity space approach is one of the most established model-based fault detection methods. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the parity space-based fault detection monitoring system from the cyber security viewpoint considering an attack on the actuator channel. It is shown that under certain conditions a cyber attack can bypass the fault detection system based on the parity space approach without being detected. This weakness may be used by an adversary to conduct a cyber attack and remain undetected. Conditions of existence of a completely stealthy cyber attack are provided in the paper. Moreover, suggestions are given for a system developer to avoid completely stealthy attacks. An illustrative example is given to demonstrate the main results.
引用
收藏
页码:4424 / 4429
页数:6
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