LOST IN THE MAIL: A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON CRIME

被引:7
作者
Castillo, Marco [1 ,2 ]
Petrie, Ragan [1 ,2 ]
Torero, Maximo [3 ]
Viceisza, Angelino [4 ]
机构
[1] George Mason Univ, Interdisciplinary Ctr Econ Sci ICES, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
[2] George Mason Univ, Dept Econ, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
[3] Int Food Policy Res Inst, Washington, DC 20006 USA
[4] Spelman Coll, Dept Econ, Atlanta, GA 30314 USA
关键词
CORRUPTION; POLICE; UGANDA;
D O I
10.1111/ecin.12046
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Stealing, shirking, and opportunistic behavior in general can create barriers to the development of markets. The costs associated with such behavior are shared by both firms and individuals and can be large enough to even prevent the initiation of trade. Measurement of these costs is difficult because information is not available for transactions that fail to occur. We use a field experiment to identify opportunistic crime in a task that is important and relevant for trade: the delivery of mail. We subtly manipulate the content and information available in mail sent to households across neighborhoods that vary by income, and detected high levels of shirking and stealing. Eighteen percent of the mail never arrived at its destination, and significantly more was lost if there was even a slight hint of something additional inside the envelope. Our results demonstrate the importance of transaction costs created by crime and that not all populations are equally affected. Middle-income neighborhoods suffer the most.
引用
收藏
页码:285 / 303
页数:19
相关论文
共 29 条
[1]   The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the Basque Country [J].
Abadie, A ;
Gardeazabal, J .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2003, 93 (01) :113-132
[2]   Income distribution, political instability, and investment [J].
Alesina, A ;
Perotti, R .
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1996, 40 (06) :1203-1228
[3]   An alternative test of racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches: Theory and evidence [J].
Anwar, S ;
Fang, HM .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2006, 96 (01) :127-151
[4]  
Armantier Olivier, 2008, WORKING PAPER
[5]   ECONOMIC-GROWTH IN A CROSS-SECTION OF COUNTRIES [J].
BARRO, RJ .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1991, 106 (02) :407-443
[6]   CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J].
BECKER, GS .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (02) :169-217
[7]   Obtaining a driver's license in India: An experimental approach to studying corruption [J].
Bertrand, Marianne ;
Djankov, Simeon ;
Hanna, Rema ;
Mullainathan, Sendhil .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2007, 122 (04) :1639-1676
[8]   Carrots, sticks, and broken windows [J].
Corman, H ;
Mocan, N .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 2005, 48 (01) :235-266
[9]   The role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of Buenos Aires [J].
Di Tella, R ;
Schargrodsky, E .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 2003, 46 (01) :269-292
[10]   Do police reduce crime? Estimates using the allocation of police forces after a terrorist attack [J].
Di Tella, R ;
Schargrodsky, E .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2004, 94 (01) :115-133