Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs

被引：0

作者：

Ball, Richard ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Haverford Coll, Dept Econ, Haverford, PA 19041 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2017年 / 152卷

关键词：

Evolution; Replicator dynamics; Monotonicity; Sample-based beliefs; GAME-THEORY; PLAY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.009

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper considers a class of evolutionary game-theoretic models, namely those in which agents form beliefs about the behavior of others on the basis of random samples from the population. It shows that the dynamics of these models violate the property of monotonicity, which many authors have argued any well-specified evolutionary model should possess. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：100 / 104

页数：5

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