On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium

被引:7
作者
Cartwright, Edward [1 ]
Wooders, Myrna [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Kent, Keynes Coll, Dept Econ, Canterbury CT2 7NP, Kent, England
[2] Vanderbilt Univ, Dept Econ, Nashville, TN 37235 USA
[3] Univ Warwick, Dept Econ, Coventry CV3 7AL, W Midlands, England
关键词
Semi-anonymous games; Purification; Expost Nash; Bayesian equilibrium; STRATEGIES;
D O I
10.1007/s00182-008-0149-y
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an ex post stable strategy vector implies the existence of an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies that is also expost stable. Through examples we demonstrate the 'bounds obtained on the approximation' are tight.
引用
收藏
页码:127 / 136
页数:10
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