This paper presents several options designed to help the Commonwealth of Massachusetts move to universal health insurance covet-age. The alternatives all build upon a common base that includes an expansion of the Medicaid program, income-related tax credits, a purchasing pool, and government-sponsored reinsurance. These measures in themselves would not yield universal coverage, nor would an employer mandate by itself. We show that an individual mandate, and an employer mandate combined with an individual mandate, both would yield universal covet-age with a relatively small increase in government costs relative to state gross domestic product and current health spending. The cost of an employer mandate-with a "pay or play" design-is sensitive to the payroll tax rate and base, the number and kind of exemptions, and whether workers whose employers "pay" receive discounts when they put-chase health insurance. The development of these alternatives and their analyses contributed to the eventual health care compromise that emerged in Massachusetts in April 2006.
