Aspiration-based coevolution of node weights promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

被引：54

作者：

Chu, Chen ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Mu, Chunjiang ^{[4
,5
]}

Liu, Jinzhuo ^{[4
,5
]}

Liu, Chen ^{[6
]}

Boccaletti, Stefano ^{[7
,8
]}

Shi, Lei ^{[1
]}

Wang, Zhen ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Stat & Math, Dept Stat, Kunming 650221, Yunnan, Peoples R China

[2] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Mech Engn, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China

[3] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Ctr OPT IMagery Anal & Learning OPTIMAL, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China

[4] Yunnan Univ, Sch Software, Kunming 650504, Yunnan, Peoples R China

[5] Key Lab Software Engn Yunnan Prov, Kunming 650091, Yunnan, Peoples R China

[6] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Ctr Ecol & Environm Sci, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China

[7] CNR, Inst Complex Syst, Via Madonna Piano 10, I-50019 Florence, Italy

[8] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Unmanned Syst Res Inst, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China

来源：

NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS | 2019年 / 21卷 / 06期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

cooperation; cyclic dominance; coevolution; social dilemma; EVOLUTION;

D O I：

10.1088/1367-2630/ab0999

中图分类号：

O4 [物理学];

学科分类号：

0702 ;

摘要：

Coevolution is considered as an effective means to optimize the conditions for the survival of cooperation. In this work, we propose a coevolution rule between individuals' node weights and aspiration, and then explore how this mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We show that there is an optimistic amplitude of node weights that guarantees the survival of cooperation even when temptation to antisocial behavior is relatively large. An explanation is provided from a microscopic point of view by dividing nodes into four different types. What is interesting, our coevolution rule results in spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, where defectors with low weight become cooperators by imitating cooperators with high weight.

引用

页数：7

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