Overcoming Free-Riding in Information Goods: Sanctions or Rewards?

被引:0
作者
Hashim, Matthew J. [1 ]
Bockstedt, Jesse C. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
来源
2015 48TH HAWAII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCES (HICSS) | 2015年
关键词
PUBLIC-GOODS; PUNISHMENT; PROVISION; PIRACY; ENFORCEMENT; DEMAND;
D O I
10.1109/HICSS.2015.574
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Economic environments involving information goods suffer from an extensive free-riding problem. For example, social loafing and lurking on discussion forums, leeching on file-sharing networks, and pirating of digital goods. Despite their use, it is not clear what types of interventions result in the best outcomes for all players involved. We conduct a lab experiment using a public goods game to explore the role of rewards and sanctions or free-riding behavior at both the individual and group levels. Our results provide interesting insights on the behavior of free-riding and the use of incentives. Interestingly, sanctioning only the worst free-rider results in a significant decrease in free-riding for that player and marginal decreases in free-riding for all others. Rewarding only the highest contributor results in a significant increase in free-riding for everyone. Overall, our research offers significant insights for the design and implementation of interventions for environments having the free-rider problem.
引用
收藏
页码:4834 / 4843
页数:10
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