The Political Sources of Systematic Investment Risk: Lessons from a Consensus Democracy

被引:51
作者
Bechtel, Michael M. [1 ]
机构
[1] ETH, Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Ctr Comparat & Int Studies, Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
US TRADE-POLICY; DIVIDED GOVERNMENT; STOCK-MARKET; ECONOMIC-DETERMINANTS; BUDGET DEFICITS; PARTISANSHIP; INSTITUTIONS; EQUILIBRIUM; PERFORMANCE; ELECTIONS;
D O I
10.1017/S0022381609090525
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
This study examines the relationships between democratic politics and systematic investment (or capital) risk. Low risk is crucial to any well-functioning economy, as it encourages capital investment, facilitates growth, and enhances overall economic performance. This article distinguishes preelectoral, postelectoral, and institutional factors and examines how these influence systematic investment risk using daily stock market data from Germany. The results suggest that more (less) favorable and reliable investment conditions during the incumbency of right (left)-leaning governments lead to lower (higher) investment risk. This partisan effect is stronger the more inflation increases and depends on whether government is unified or divided. Investors also anticipate the effect of government partisanship: systematic risk decreases (increases) if the electoral prospects of a right (left)-leaning government enhance. Finally, grand coalition governments as well as periods of coalition formation trigger higher investment risk.
引用
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页码:661 / 677
页数:17
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