A cognitive hierarchy model of games

被引:805
作者
Camerer, CF [1 ]
Ho, TH
Chong, JK
机构
[1] CALTECH, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[3] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Suwon, South Korea
[4] Natl Univ Singapore, Singapore 117548, Singapore
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1162/0033553041502225
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Players in a game are "in equilibrium" if they are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is "cognitive hierarchy" ( CH) theory, where each player assumes that his strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has inductively defined strategic categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers best-respond, assuming that other players are distributed over step 0 through step k-1. This model fits empirical data, and explains why equilibrium theory predicts behavior well in some games and poorly in others. An average of 1.5 steps fits data from many games.
引用
收藏
页码:861 / 898
页数:38
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