This paper analyzes Leibniz's concept of "creation out of nothing. from a double perspective. On the one hand, I present the essentialist model of creation, which is understood as a transition of essences from the realm of mere possibilities to the realm of existence. I also explain the difficulties that this approach entail by devaluating divine causality. On the other hand, I present the "participationist" model, according to which the whole perfection of the creature is in actual and radical dependence of the divine perfections. I analyze the difficulties of this model, in particular those which arise from the introduction of the controversial concept of "participation in nothingness". Finally, the paper aims to show how the technical explanation of the idea of participation-through the definition of the individual substance based in the possible "complete concept" present in the divine understanding-implies the reduction of this participationist model to the essentialist approach which prevails in Leibniz's thought.
