Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

被引:67
作者
Abbink, Klaus [1 ]
Dasgupta, Utteeyo [2 ]
Gangadharan, Lata [1 ]
Jain, Tarun [3 ]
机构
[1] Monash Univ, Dept Econ, Clayton, Vic 3800, Australia
[2] Franklin & Marshall Coll, Dept Econ, Lancaster, PA 17604 USA
[3] Indian Sch Business, Finance Econ & Publ Policy Area, Hyderabad 500032, Andhra Pradesh, India
关键词
Harassment bribes; Experiment; Asymmetric penalty; Retaliation; CORRUPTION; CULTURE; GENDER;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:17 / 28
页数:12
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