Reinventing environmental regulation from the grassroots up: Explaining and expanding the success of the toxics release inventory

The success of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) stands in stark contrast to most other environmental regulations in the United States. Between its inception in 1988 and 1995, releases of chemicals listed on the TRI have declined by 45%. We argue the TRI has achieved this regulatory success by creating a mechanism of "populist maximin regulation." This style of regulation differs from traditional command-and-control in several ways. First, the major role of public agencies is not to set and enforce standards, but to establish an information-rich context for private citizens. interest groups, and firms to solve environmental problems. Second, environmental "standards" are not determined by expert analysis of acceptable risk, but are effectively set at the levels informed citizens will accept. Third, firms adopt pollution prevention and abatement measures in response to a dynamic range of public pressures rather than to formalized agency standards or governmental sanction. Finally, public pressure ruthlessly focuses on the worst polluters-maximum attention to minimum performers-to induce them to adopt more effective environmental practices. TRI has inadvertently set in motion this alternative style of regulation that has, in turn, dramatically reduced toxics emissions in the United Stales. By properly understanding the mechanisms that drive TRI's accomplishments, more intentional public policy designs can expand the system of populist maxi-min regulation and achieve even more rapid toxics reduction.