Cross-ownership and collateral in lending

被引:5
作者
Qian, Xuesong [1 ]
Ding, Zifang [1 ]
Cao, Xiaping [2 ]
Qi, Shusen [3 ]
机构
[1] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[2] Xian Jiaotong Liverpool Univ, Xian, Peoples R China
[3] Xiamen Univ, Sch Management, 422 Siming South Rd, Xiamen, Fujian, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Information asymmetry; Intercorporate loans; Cross-ownership; Collateral; INTERNAL CAPITAL-MARKETS; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; BUSINESS GROUPS; CREDIT MARKETS; FINANCE; INFORMATION; SELECTION; FIRMS; LAW;
D O I
10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101572
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Information asymmetry is a major obstacle in both formal and informal loan markets. However, when a bor-rower and a lender are connected via cross-ownership, this obstacle can be significantly reduced. Cross -ownership enables lenders to collect more concrete and precise information about borrowers, and this lowered information asymmetry reduces the likelihood that the lender will require the borrower to provide collateral. Using a data set of 1091 intercorporate loans from China, we find strong support for the prediction that cross ownership between lenders and borrowers lowers the collateral requirements by more than 50%. This relation is more pronounced for informationally opaque borrowers and for lending firms with a controlling stake in the borrowing firms.
引用
收藏
页数:10
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