Outside Options and the Failure of the Coase Conjecture

被引:39
作者
Board, Simon [1 ]
Pycia, Marek [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
关键词
BARGAINING MODEL; MONOPOLY;
D O I
10.1257/aer.104.2.656
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time. Each period the buyer can also exercise an outside option, abandoning their search or moving on to another seller. We show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price, contravening the Coase conjecture. We then embed the single-seller model into a search framework and show the result provides a foundation for the usual "no haggling" assumption. (JEL C78, D42, D43, L12, L13)
引用
收藏
页码:656 / 671
页数:16
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