LICENSING 'WEAK' PATENTS

被引：18

作者：

Encaoua, David ^{[1
]}

Lefouili, Yassine ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Paris 01, Paris Sch Econ, CES, 106-112 Bd Hop, F-75647 Paris 13, France

[2] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

[3] Paris Sch Econ, Paris, France

来源：

JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 57卷 / 03期

关键词：

LITIGATION; INCENTIVES;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00386.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we revisit the issue of licensing 'weak' patents under the shadow of litigation. Departing from the seminal paper by Farrell and Shapiro [2008], we consider innovations of any size and not only 'small' innovations, and we allow the number of licensees to be less than the number of firms in the downstream industry. It is shown that the optimal two-part tariff license from the patent holder's perspective may either deter or trigger litigation, and conditions under which each case arises are provided. We also reexamine the claim that the licensing revenues from 'weak' patents overcompensate the patent holder relative to what a natural benchmark would command. Finally we suggest two policy levers that may alleviate the harm raised by the licensing of 'weak' patents.

引用

页码：492 / 525

页数：34

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