The analysis and prevention of the risks in supply chain based on problems of principal-agent

被引：0

作者：

Liu Fan ^{[1
]}

Cheng Guoping ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430070, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF 2005 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INNOVATION & MANAGEMENT | 2005年

关键词：

principal-agent; supply chain; adverse selection; moral hazard; prevention;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Enterprises engaged in supply chain are faced with principal-agent problems because of information asymmetry. This paper analyzes the risks in supply chain management. Then, it prevents adverse selection problem from the perspective of manufacturer different from the vendor signals theory which used in the past and sets up the guarding model to cut down the risks of moral hazard. Finally, the paper proposes the guarding ideas of the two risks.

引用

页码：717 / 721

页数：5