Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped

被引：26
作者：
Klaus, B
Peters, H
Storcken, T
机构：
[1] Maastricht University, Dept. Quantit. Econ., P.O. B., Maastricht
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1997年 / 55卷 / 03期
关键词：
single-dipped preferences; strategy-proofness; replacement principle; consistency;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00097-9
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof distributions of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-dipped preferences are studied. In order to satisfy these two properties and, in addition, either a so-called replacement property or a property of consistency, the whole amount should be assigned to one of the agents. Characterizations of the two classes of division rules satisfying the above conditions are provided. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
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页码：339 / 346
页数：8
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