Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

被引：32

作者：

Chu, Chen ^{[1
]}

Zhai, Yao ^{[2
,3
]}

Mu, Chunjiang ^{[2
,4
]}

Hu, Die ^{[2
,4
]}

Li, Tong ^{[2
,5
]}

Shi, Lei ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Stat & Math, Dept Stat, Kunming 650221, Yunnan, Peoples R China

[2] Key Lab Software Engn Yunnan Prov, Kunming 650504, Yunnan, Peoples R China

[3] Yunnan Minzu Univ, Sch Math & Comp Sci, Kunming 650504, Yunnan, Peoples R China

[4] Yunnan Univ, Sch Software, Kunming 650504, Yunnan, Peoples R China

[5] Yunnan Agr Univ, Sch Big Data, Kunming 650201, Yunnan, Peoples R China

来源：

APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION | 2019年 / 362卷

关键词：

Cooperation; Evolutionary games; Popularity; Network reciprocity; Social dilemmas; SOCIAL DILEMMA; EMERGENCE; NETWORKS; COEVOLUTION; PUNISHMENT; EVOLUTION; SYSTEM;

D O I：

10.1016/j.amc.2019.06.007

中图分类号：

O29 [应用数学];

学科分类号：

070104 ;

摘要：

The popularity of each individual in a realistic social system adaptively changes within a population. In this paper, we propose the coevolution of popularity and strategy and explore potential reasons that how this setup affects the evolution of cooperation in structured population. The popularity of each individual is defined as a function of parameter alpha and vertex weight that evolves by delta overtime. Through simulation, we find that our mechanism enables the survival of cooperation when b is relatively large. For the above results, we provide a detailed explanation through systematic analysis of typical configuration patterns. Our conclusion provides an insight for understanding cooperation in social systems. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：7

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