Bilateral Transaction of Bayesian game in Reformed Electricity Spot Market

被引:0
|
作者
Kong, Piaohong [1 ]
Yang, Liqiang [2 ]
Hu, Zhenyu [1 ]
Lin, Xueshan [3 ]
Wang, Beibei [3 ]
机构
[1] State Grid Corp China, State Grid Zhejiang Elect Power Co LTD, Hangzhou, Peoples R China
[2] State Grid Corp China, Huzhou Power Supply Co State Grid Zhejiang Elect, Huzhou, Peoples R China
[3] Southeast Univ, Coll Elect Engn, Nanjing, Peoples R China
来源
2021 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POWER AND ENERGY SYSTEMS (ICPES 2021) | 2021年
关键词
bilateral transaction; reformed electricity spot market; elastic demand; load aggregator; renewable energy generation; Bayesian game; EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING STRATEGIES;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
With the promotion of electricity market reform, the renewable energy resource and elastic demand gradually turned to the mean subject of electricity market transaction. Due to the inaccurately forecasts of the renewable energy output value, the renewable energy consumption in electricity spot market is insufficient. Therefore, the power waste of renewable energy increases year by year with the increase of installed capacity of the renewable energy resources. Through the bilateral transaction model based on the Bayesian game, the Bayes-Nash equilibrium point of the quoted price and quantity of both sides can be calculated. Among them, the quoted price calculation considers the game process of demand-side and supply-side. The quoted quantity calculation considers the supply-side game and the demand-side game, respectively. Also, the actual operation of the electricity spot market is considered. The simulation results illustrate the bilateral transaction model can well applicated in the reformed electricity spot market.
引用
收藏
页码:626 / 632
页数:7
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