Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions

被引：9

作者：

Holzman, R ^{[1
]}

Monderer, D

机构：

[1] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Dept Math, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel

[2] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2004年 / 47卷 / 01期

基金：

以色列科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved by Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz (2003), according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi-field. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：87 / 103

页数：17