Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions

被引：9
作者：
Holzman, R [1 ]
Monderer, D
机构：
[1] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Dept Math, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
[2] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2004年 / 47卷 / 01期
基金：
以色列科学基金会;
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved by Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz (2003), according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi-field. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：87 / 103
页数：17
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