OUTSOURCING IMMIGRATION COMPLIANCE

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[83] What do alternative sanctions mean? [J]. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 1996, 63 (02) : 591 - 653

[84] Social influence, social meaning, and deterrence [J]. VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, 1997, 83 (02) : 349 - 395

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[87] KANSTROOM D, 2002, STANFORD LAW REV, V54, P953

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[89] Kennedy R., 1997, RACE CRIME LAW

[90] KEOHANE RO, 2007, POWER INTERDEPENDENC, P23

[81] THEORY OF FIRM - MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1976, 3 (04) : 305 - 360

[82] Kahan DanM., 1997, MICH LAW REV, V95, P2477

[83] What do alternative sanctions mean? [J]. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 1996, 63 (02) : 591 - 653

[84] Social influence, social meaning, and deterrence [J]. VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, 1997, 83 (02) : 349 - 395

[85] Gentle nudges vs. hard shoves: Solving the sticky norms problem [J]. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 2000, 67 (03) : 607 - 645

[86] KAHAN DM, 2000, U CHICAGO LAW REV, V67, P645

[87] KANSTROOM D, 2002, STANFORD LAW REV, V54, P953

[88] An economic analysis of the guaranty contract [J]. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 1999, 66 (01) : 47 - 116

[89] Kennedy R., 1997, RACE CRIME LAW

[90] KEOHANE RO, 2007, POWER INTERDEPENDENC, P23