An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games

被引：203

作者：

Grabisch, M

Roubens, M

机构：

[1] Thomson CSF, Cent Res Lab, F-91404 Orsay, France

[2] Univ Liege, Inst Math, B-4000 Liege, Belgium

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1999年 / 28卷 / 04期

关键词：

cooperative games; interaction among players; Shapley values; Banzhaf values; coalition;

D O I：

10.1007/s001820050125

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

An axiomatization of the interaction between the players of any coalition is given. It is based on three axioms: linearity, dummy land symmetry. These interaction indices extend the Banzhaf and Shapley values when using in addition two equivalent recursive axioms. Lastly, we give an expression of the Banzhaf and Shapley interaction indices in terms of pseudo-Boolean functions.

引用

页码：547 / 565

页数：19

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[2]

DENNEBERG D, 1996, 76 U BREM

[3]

DERKS J, 1997, RM97016 U MAASTR

[4] The application of fuzzy integrals in multicriteria decision making [J].