Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse

被引：2

作者：

Moreno, Diego ^{[1
]}

Wooders, John ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Econ, E-28903 Getafe, Spain

[2] New York Univ Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2017年 / 154卷

基金：

澳大利亚研究理事会;

关键词：

Second-price auctions; Endogenous entry; Public and secret reserve prices; Risk aversion;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rp above the seller's cost c, but lowers the secret reserve price rs below the revenue maximizing reserve price ro. Further, r(p) < r(s). Hence, for a risk averse seller, public and secret reserve prices are ordered: c < r(p) < r(s) < r(0). (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：6 / 9

页数：4