Overcoming obstacles to peace: The contribution of mediation to short-lived conflict settlements

We argue that a factor widely seen as facilitating cooperation in an international dispute, mediation, is also a sign that a resulting agreement is likely to be short-lived. Mediators get the tough cases, disputes that are most likely to result in short-lived settlements-a selection effect. At the same time, mediation helps to resolve a conflict's underlying issues, making mediated settlements more likely to last-a process effect. We develop a theory that captures these opposing forces-focusing on the conditional effect of mediation on nonstate actors-and taking into account critical aspects of the disputants, conflict, conflict management processes and settlement. Using hazard analysis, Heckman two-stage probit and logistic regression, we statistically analyze over 1,400 settlements drawn from the just released International Conflict Management 2000 data set and also conduct a quantitative case study of mediation tools used in the former Yugoslavia. All analyses find strong support for the opposing effects of mediation; mediated agreements are more likely to be short-lived, unless they involve nonstate actors. This study advances our understanding of selection effects and the factors that lead to short-lived settlements, and provides policy makers and potential mediators a way to establish realistic expectations about the durability of dispute settlements.