Markets with asymmetric information:: The contributions of George!Akerlof, Michael!Spence and Joseph!Stiglitz

被引：56
作者：
Löfgren, KG
Persson, T
Weibull, JW
机构：
[1] Umea Univ, SE-90187 Umea, Sweden
[2] Stockholm Univ, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
[3] Stockholm Sch Econ, SE-11383 Stockholm, Sweden
来源：
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2002年 / 104卷 / 02期
关键词：
asymmetric information; adverse selection; signaling; screening;
D O I：
10.1111/1467-9442.00280
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：195 / 211
页数：17
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