UNIQUENESS AND METAEPISTEMOLOGY

被引：56
作者：
Greco, Daniel [1 ]
Hedden, Brian [2 ]
机构：
[1] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[2] Univ Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
来源：
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2016年 / 113卷 / 08期
关键词：
HIGHER-ORDER EVIDENCE; RATIONALITY; DISAGREEMENT; REFLECTION; CONDITIONALIZATION; REQUIREMENTS; EPISTEMOLOGY; KNOWLEDGE; COHERENT;
D O I：
10.5840/jphil2016113825
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：365 / 395
页数：31
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