How not to prove your election outcome

被引：24

作者：

Haines, Thomas ^{[1
]}

Lewis, Sarah Jamie ^{[2
]}

Pereira, Olivier ^{[3
]}

Teague, Vanessa ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Norwegian Univ Sci & Technol, Trondheim, Norway

[2] Open Privacy Res Soc, Vancouver, BC, Canada

[3] UCLouvain, ICTEAM, B-1348 Louvain La Neuve, Belgium

[4] Univ Melbourne, Sch Comp & Informat Syst, Melbourne, Vic, Australia

来源：

2020 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY (SP 2020) | 2020年

关键词：

D O I：

10.1109/SP40000.2020.00048

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

The Scytl/SwissPost e-voting solution was intended to provide complete verifiability for Swiss government elections. We show failures in both individual verifiability and universal verifiability (as defined in Swiss Federal Ordinance 161.116), based on mistaken implementations of cryptographic components. These failures allow for the construction of "proofs" of an accurate election outcome that pass verification though the votes have been manipulated. Using sophisticated cryptographic protocols without a proper consideration of what properties they offer, and under which conditions, can introduce opportunities for undetectable fraud even though the system appears to allow verification of the outcome. Our findings are immediately relevant to systems in use in Switzerland and Australia, and probably also elsewhere.

引用

页码：644 / 660

页数：17

共 20 条

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