ELITE IDENTITY AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A TALE OF TEN ISLANDS

被引:3
作者
Carvalho, Jean-Paul
Dippel, Christian
机构
[1] Univ Calif Irvine, Los Angeles, CA 92697 USA
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
PUBLIC-GOODS; INSTITUTIONS; GOVERNMENT; DEMOCRACY; POWER; MODEL; EVOLUTION; SUFFRAGE; ECONOMY; GROWTH;
D O I
10.1093/ej/ueaa018
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Emancipation of slaves in the 1830s transformed the political elites of the British Caribbean plantation islands. New elites were more accountable to the citizenry. We develop a theory in which two factors limit and possibly reverse the effect of this on political outcomes, with legislators: (i) 'stepping up' to pass extractive policies; and/or (ii) weakening democratic institutions. The theory is supported by an historical analysis of ten Caribbean plantation islands, based on original archival data on legislator race, occupation and roll-call voting. Eventually, all assemblies that experienced a significant change in composition dissolved themselves and converted to British 'Crown Rule'.
引用
收藏
页码:1995 / 2029
页数:35
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