Contribution to productivity or pork barrel?: The two faces of infrastructure investment

被引:127
作者
Cadot, Olivier [1 ]
Roeller, Lars-Hendrik
Stephan, Andreas
机构
[1] HEC Lausanne, CERDI, Lausanne, Switzerland
[2] Humboldt Univ, WZB, INSEAD, Berlin, Germany
[3] DIW Berlin, Berlin, Germany
关键词
growth; infrastructure; political economy; lobbying; France;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy. Our empirical findings on a panel of France's regions over 1985-92 suggest that electoral concerns and influence activities were, indeed, significant determinants of the cross-regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments. By contrast, we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending, even after controlling for pork-barrel. (c) 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:1133 / 1153
页数:21
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