Unconstitutional constitutional amendment or constitutional dismemberment? A reappraisal of the presidential term limit amendment in Cameroon

被引:1
|
作者
Enonchong, Laura-Stella [1 ]
机构
[1] De Montfort Univ, Gateway House, Leicester LE1 9BH, England
关键词
Cameroon; presidential term limit provisions; incumbency advantage; constitutional dismemberment; constitutional amendment; POLITICS; LAW;
D O I
10.1017/S2045381721000290
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Presidential term limit provisions are often perceived as a feature of modern democratic systems. It has been argued that their existence is a key intervention mechanism to pre-empt some undemocratic outcomes associated with incumbency advantages. In 2008, the Constitution of Cameroon was amended to abolish the presidential term limit. More than ten years on, there are ostensible signs of a democratic decline. This article takes a retrospective look at the constitutional amendment to assess its constitutionality. It is argued that a conclusion on the constitutionality of the amendment may not be unequivocal. Nevertheless, there are substantial grounds for considering the constitutional change as a constitutional dismemberment. This is premised on the fact that, although the amendment followed the normal rules for constitutional amendments, the transformation amounted to a fundamental break with the constitutional commitment to democracy that underpinned the adoption of the 1996 Constitution.
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页码:274 / 296
页数:23
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