In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral majority rules. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting these rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases.
机构:
Coll William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
Coll William & Mary, Program Publ Policy, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USAColl William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
Campbell, Donald E.
;
Kelly, Jerry S.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Syracuse Univ, Dept Econ, Syracuse, NY 13244 USAColl William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
机构:
Coll William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
Coll William & Mary, Program Publ Policy, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USAColl William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
Campbell, Donald E.
;
Kelly, Jerry S.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Syracuse Univ, Dept Econ, Syracuse, NY 13244 USAColl William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
机构:
Coll William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
Coll William & Mary, Program Publ Policy, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USAColl William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
Campbell, Donald E.
;
Kelly, Jerry S.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Syracuse Univ, Dept Econ, Syracuse, NY 13244 USAColl William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
机构:
Coll William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
Coll William & Mary, Program Publ Policy, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USAColl William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
Campbell, Donald E.
;
Kelly, Jerry S.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Syracuse Univ, Dept Econ, Syracuse, NY 13244 USAColl William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA