Utilitarian aggregation of beliefs and tastes

被引：79

作者：

Gilboa, I ^{[1
]}

Samet, D

Schmeidler, D

机构：

[1] Tel Aviv Univ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[2] Yale Univ, Cowles Fdn, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[3] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2004年 / 112卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/421173

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Harsanyi's utilitarianism is extended here to Savage's framework. We formulate a Pareto condition that implies that both society's utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals. An indiscriminate Pareto condition has been shown to contradict linear aggregation of beliefs and tastes. We argue that such a condition is not compelling: Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Our Pareto condition is restricted to choices that involve identical beliefs only.

引用

页码：932 / 938

页数：7