ADVANTAGEOUS SELECTION, MORAL HAZARD, AND INSURER SORTING ON RISK IN THE US AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE MARKET

被引：8

作者：

Robinson, Patricia A. ^{[1
]}

Sloan, Frank A. ^{[1
]}

Eldred, Lindsey M. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Duke Univ, Dept Econ, 213 Social Sci Bldg,Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE | 2018年 / 85卷 / 02期

关键词：

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; ADVERSE SELECTION; TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS; PRIVATE INFORMATION; HEALTH; RETIREMENT; LIABILITY; CARE;

D O I：

10.1111/jori.12170

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study quantifies the role of private information in automobile insurance policy choice using data on subjective beliefs, risk preference, reckless driving, the respondent's insurer, and insurance policy characteristics merged with insurer-specific quality ratings distributed by independent organizations. We find a zero correlation between ex post accident risk and insurance coverage, reflecting advantageous selection in policy choice offset by moral hazard. Advantageous selection is partly attributable to insurer sorting on consumer attributes known and used by insurers. Our analysis of insurer sorting reveals that lower-risk drivers on attributes observed by insurers obtain coverage from insurers with higher-quality ratings.

引用

页码：545 / 575

页数：31

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